Salt Lake City v. James Piepenberg : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Salt Lake City v. James Piepenberg : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce C. Lubeck; Attorney for Appellant.
Roger F. Cutler; City Attorney; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Piepenberg, No. 14688.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1576
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A : 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES PIEPENBURG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14688 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Presiding. 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROGER CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
r i L t u 
JAN 19 1977 
ClsrL', Suprcrr.s Ccurf, Ufah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A : 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES PIEPENBURG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14688 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Presiding. 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROGER CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VII: SECTION 32-2-10 (3) SALT LAKE 
CITY REVISED ORDINANCE VIOLATES 
THE FREE SPEECH AND PRESS PROVI-
SIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE PENUMBRA OF 
RIGHTS GUARANTEEING PRIVACY THAT 
SURROUND THE FIRST, FOURTH, FIFTH 
AND NINTH AMENDMENTS BECAUSE ON 
ITS FACE IT SWEEPS WITHIN ITS 
AMBIT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
PRIVATE ACTIVITIES 1 
A. WHEN A STATUTE IS ATTACKED AS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
THE DEFENDANT NEED ONLY SHOW THAT 
IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
HE NEED NOT SHOW THAT HIS PARTI-
CULAR ACTIVITIES ARE PROTECTED. 2 
SECTION 32-2-10 (3) SALT LAKE 
CITY REVISED ORDINANCE ON ITS 
FACE AND AS APPLIED, ABRIDGES 
THE FREE SPEECH AND PRESS PRO-
VISIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
PROVIDE FOR PROPER APPELLATE REVIEW 
OF LOWER COURT FINDINGS OF OBSCEN-
I T Y 4 
A. SECTION 32-2-10 (3) IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
FOR PROMPT APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
LOWER COURT FINDINGS OF OBSCENITY 6 
POINT IX: THE CITY ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH 
APPELLANT STANDS CONVICTED IS INCON-
SISTENT WITH THE STATE STATUTE 
POINT VIII: 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(cont.) 
Page 
COVERING THE SAME MATTERS 
AND, THEREFORE, IS INVALID 8 
POINT X: THE FAILURE OF THE COURT BELOW 
TO GIVE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
TO A JUDGMENT OF A SISTER STATE 
DENIED DEFENDANT HIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
CASES CITED 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 
229 (1963) 5 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) 6 
Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 620 
(9th Cir. 1966) 11 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 2 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) 5 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 247 
F.Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 1965) 5,7 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 9 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 3 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 4 
Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 
437 P. 2d 434 (1968) 8 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) 11 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 147 (19 69) 2 
State ex rel. Yeager v. Neal, 26 N.C.App. 
741, 217 S.E. 2d 576 (1975) 10 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) 3 
United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891) 12 
United States v. International Mining and 
Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) 11 ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(cont.) 
Page 
United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 ( 
(7th Cir. 1962) 11 
Zietlin v. Arnebergh, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 
383 P.2d 152 (1903) • ~ 5 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED < 
United States Constitution, Art. IV, 
Sec. 1 10 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 9 4 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-10-1201 et. seq. (1953) 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Jurisprudence, Municipal Corpor-
ation, §165 8,9 
27 Federal Rules Decisions 157 11 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
32-2-10 (3) 1,8,9 
iii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a : 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES PIEPENBURG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14688 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, James Piepenburg, has previously 
filed with this court his original brief on appeal. Respond-
ent has not yet filed its responsive brief. Appellant sought 
and obtained an order granting him permission to file a 
supplemental brief prior to the filing of respondent's brief 
so that respondent could meet appellantfs arguments in 
respondent's original brief. This supplemental brief con-
tains additional arguments of law and no additional factual 
matters. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VII 
SECTION 32-2-10 (3) SALT LAKE CITY 
REVISED ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE FREE 
SPEECH AND PRESS PROVISIONS OF THE 
FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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< 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND THE PENUMBRA OF RIGHTS GUAR-
ANTEEING PRIVACY THAT SURROUND THE 
FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH AND 
NINTH AMENDMENTS BECAUSE ON ITS 
FACE IT SWEEPS WITHIN ITS AMBIT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PRIVATE 
ACTIVITIES 
Section 32-2-10 (3) prohibits the mere "copying," 
"composing," "drawing" or "furnishing" of obscene materials 
with intent to distribute them either commercially or non-
commercially. Under this ordinance, Mr. Stanley, who the 
Supreme Court unanimously held in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557 (1969) can "possess" obscene materials, cannot 
make a copy of them or write or draw them with the intent 
to give them to his wife, brother or roommate as the case 
may be. This is an interference with protected activity. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
the Court, interpreting the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, recognized that private 
sexual matters were no business of the government and that 
people could receive reading materials for their own 
private sexual use. 
A. When a Statute is Attacked as 
Violative of the First Amendment 
the Defendant Need Only Show That 
it is Unconstitutional on its Face. 
He Need not Show That his Parti-
cular Activities are Protected. 
-2-
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Admittedly the appellant herein was convicted of 
commercially exhibiting obscenity, but the test of whether 
a statute offends the First Amendment is whether it can 
possibly be interpreted to reach protected activities. 
If so, it is unconstitutional, even if the activities of 
the party questioning the statute are not themselves pro-
tected. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). 
In NAACP v. Button, the Court held: 
"For in appraising a statute's 
inhibitory effect on such (First 
Amendment) rights, this Court has 
not hesitated to take into account 
possible applications of the stat-
ute in other factual contexts be-
sides that at bar." (371 U.S. at 432, 
9 L.Ed.2d at 418) 
Thus, whether the activities of appellant in this 
case are commercial or noncommercial (i.e., whether they 
are protected or not) does not bar it from attacking the 
statute on its face for overbreadth. 
-3-
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POINT VIII 
SECTION 32-2-10 (3) SALT LAKE CITY 
REVISED ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE AND 
AS APPLIED, ABRIDGES THE FREE SPEECH 
AND PRESS PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST AND ( 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT PROVIDE FOR PROPER APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF LOWER COURT FINDINGS OF 
OBSCENITY. 
On any case originally arising in City Court, 
the defendant is entitled to appeal to the District Court, 
but may appeal no matters to the Supreme Court other than i 
the validity of the statute. Article VIII Section 9, 
Utah Constitution. Thus, in any obscenity case origin-
ating at the city level, no court beyond the District Court { 
may inquire into the record. This is contrary to the 
command of Free Speech and Press provisions of the First 
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court and other 
courts which hold that all appellate courts must inquire 
further in First Amendment cases. Mr. Justice Harlan, con-
curring in Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957) stated: 
11
 . . . a reviewing court must 
determine for itself whether the 
attached expression is suppressable 
within constitutional standards. 
Since those standards do not readily 
-4-
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lend themselves to generalized 
definitions, the constitutional 
problem in the last analysis be-
comes one of particularized judg-
ments which appellate courts must 
make for themselves," (354 U.S. 
at 497) 
See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 Footnote 3 
(1964) . 
Any kind of a Free Speech question requires review 
of the entire record. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 31 Cal.Rptr. 
800, 383 P.2d 152, 157 (1963). 
When an obscenity statute does not provide 
adequate appellate safeguards, it must be struck down. 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 247 F.Supp. 906 (N.D. 
Tex. 1965). In Interstate, the statute was found violative 
of First Amendment freedoms because it did not provide for 
prompt appellate review of findings of obscenity. The 
Salt Lake ordinance provides for no review at all and should, 
therefore, be struck down for failure of the legislature 
to carve out an exception and permit appeals up through 
the Supreme Court on the entire record in cases involving 
-5-
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Expression. 
A. Section 32-2-10 (3) is Unconstitu-
tional for Failure to Provide for 
Prompt Appellate Review of Lower 
Court Findings of Obscenity. 
In censorship cases, the statutory scheme must 
provide for a "prompt final judicial decision" on appeal. 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 55 (1965). In Freedman, 
the Court held: 
"Risk of delay is built into the 
Maryland Procedure, as is borne 
out by experience; in the only 
reported case indicating the 
length of time required to com-
plete an appeal, the initial 
judicial determination has taken 
4 months and final vindication 
of the film on appellate review, 
6 months." (380 U.S. at 55) 
This is so because the Supreme Court believes that the First 
Amendment requires that materials be "censored" for the 
shortest possible time. The six months necessary to pro-
cess an appeal found intolerable in Freedman is shorter 
than the ordinary appeal time in Utah. In Interstate 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Circuit/ Inc. v. City of Dallas, 247 F.Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 
1965) an obscenity ordinance was struck down because it 
did not contain a provision for prompt appellate review: 
". . . there being no provision in 
the Texas statutes for prompt judi-
cial review in the trial and appellate 
courts, and experience being that 
risk of delay is built into the 
Texas Procedure, the ordinance in 
question lacks sufficient procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the 
dangers of a censorship system." 
(247 F.Supp. at 911) 
The Dallas ordinance was subsequently amended to require 
the state to waive all statutory notice of appeal and times 
for appeal, to file its brief within five (5) days and to 
permit the censored party to request advance consideration 
by the Court. See the Fifth Circuit's comments on the Dallas 
ordinance as amended after the District Court found it 
unconstitutional. 366 F.2d at 6 00. These kind of safeguards 
are not within the power of a defendant in Utah to acquire 
by his own bootstraps. The only plausible solution is for 
the court to declare the obscenity statute unconstitutional. 
-7-
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i 
This would require the legislature to amend the statutory 1 
scheme for appeal as the City of Dallas had to do in Inter-
state v, Dallas, supra. 
POINT IX 
THE CITY ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT 
STANDS CONVICTED IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE STATE STATUTE COVERING THE SAME
 ( 
MATTERS AND, THEREFORE, IS INVALID. 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-10-1201, (1953), et. seq., 
deals with the same alleged offense as the city ordinance - < 
exhibition of obscenity. The ordinance is inconsistent 
with the statute as a clear reading of both will reveal. 
In Utah, if an ordinance is inconsistent with 
a statute, the former is invalid. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 
20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968); 37 AmJur Municipal 
Corporation §165. 
The Utah ordinance is inconsistent because it 
takes the same offense the state has already defined, and 
lowers the burden of proof. A reading of the two laws 
readily shows the difference. Section 3 2-2-10 (3) makes a 
film obscene if it merely depicts obscene conduct (i.e., 
one, three-second scene could make an entire movie obscene) 
while the statute properly requires that the movie "taken 
as a whole" be obscene. This is the proper constitutional 
-8-
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test. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Thus, 
a book or movie may be not obscene under the state statute 
but obscene under the lower standard of the city ordinance. 
The city has proscribed what the state has implied is not 
obscene. This makes the ordinance invalid. See 37 AmJur 
Municipal Corporations §165. 
The devastating effect of the ordinance is 
exemplified by the recent German film "The Lost Honor of 
Katrina Blum" an acknowledged artistic triumph. It is about 
a young, introverted girl who is persecuted by the author-
ities, the press and the public because of a one-night, 
amorous involvement with a suspected anarchist. As the 
persecution slowly takes effect on her fragile personality, 
one of her anonymous tormentors sends her an obscene photo-
graph through the mail. This comes at a time when other 
indignities have driven her to an emotionally low ebb. 
It has a severe impact upon her because of her sheltered 
background. The photograph is shown clearly in the film. 
It is undeniably obscene. The exhibitors of that film if 
charged under the state statute, would obviously be acquitted 
but yet if thereafter were prosecuted by the city, they 
would be convicted under the ordinance because the film 
need only "depict obscene conduct." See §32-2-10 (3) of 
the ordinance. 
-9-
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i 
POINT X ( 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT BELOW TO GIVE 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO A JUDGMENT OF 
A SISTER STATE DENIED DEFENDANT HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMEND- i 
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The film in question had been held not obscene as 
a matter of law by the courts of North Carolina, State ex 
rel. Yeager v. Neal, 26 N.C.App. 741, 217 S.E.2d 576 (1975). 
See trial court judgment attached hereto as Appendix. A. 
This was not a jury verdict but a holding of the court 
finding the movie not obscene as a matter of law. Utah is 
required to give full faith and credit to the judgments 
( 
of sister states. Article IV, Section 1, United States 
Constitution. 
If Utah fails to follow the constitutional 
requirement, what of Mr. Piepenburg? He followed the 
constitution and relied on the holding of nonobscenity. One 
of the reasons he showed the film was because of the ruling 
in North Carolina (T-133,134). Should he serve six months 
in jail for following the ruling of the court? In the face 
of such a judgment by a sister state, if Utah chooses not 
to give full faith and credit, at least it should be 
required to go into its courts civilly and have the film 
declared obscene before it prosecutes criminally. This 
-10-
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would put residents of Utah on notice that Utah was not 
giving full faith and credit. Otherwise, people are punished 
for heeding the constitutional admonition that all states 
are bound by the judgments of the sister states of the 
union. 
Scienter (knowledge) and intent are always issues 
in obscenity cases. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 
(1959); United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 
1962); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 620, 624 (9th 
Cir. 1966). 
What criminal intent could the defendant have if 
the best source possible (a court) tells him the film is 
noncriminal? If he cannot rely on the courts to tell him 
what is or is not criminal conduct, who should he rely on? 
Mens rea does not exist if appellant in good 
faith thinks he is dealing in noncriminal material. United 
States v. International Mining and Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 
558, 563-564 (1971). 
The recommended Federal Jury Instructions on 
obscenity and the A.L.I. Modern Penal Code hold that if one 
in good faith believes the material is not obscene, that is 
a defense. 27 Federal Rules Decision, Page 157, Instruction 
22.12. Can it reasonably be claimed by Salt Lake City that 
-11-
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he was not acitng in good faith if the movie had been held 
not obscene? 
In United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891) 
the court set down the prerequisite to criminal punishment: 
" . . . all men subject to 
(criminal) penalties (must) 
know what acts it is their 
duty to avoid." (139 U.S. 
at 288) 
Jim Piepenburg was told that he need not avoid 
showing "Memories" by the final arbiter of obscenity - the 
courts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in 
appellant's original brief it is respectfully submitted that 
the judgment of the District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bruce C.Lubeck 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX "A" 
NORTH CAROLINA 
FORSYTH COUNTY 
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 
FRANK J. YEAGER, ex rel. 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN WILLIAM NEAL and 
PARKVIEW THEATER, INC., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
THIS ACTION COMING ON 
by consent before the undersigned 
the complaint of Frank J. Yeager, 
Twenty-First Judicial District of 
Court declare the movie "Memories 
in accordance with the provisions 
TO BE HEARD and being heard 
Superior Court Judge upon 
District Attorney for the 
North Carolina, to have the 
Within Miss Aggie" obscene 
of N.C.G.S. 14-190.2; 
And the Court having viewed the film by the consent 
of the parties prior to the hearing of testimony and having 
heard the testimony of Dr. Buford Jones, a professor of liter-
ature at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; of Dorothea 
Wright, a professor of English at Greensboro College and a film 
reviewer for the Greensboro Daily News; and of John R. Meyer, 
a teacher of film at Wake Forest University, other qualified 
witnesses having been tendered by the defendants but neither 
sworn nor examined; and the Court having considered the evi-
dence of the film itself and the testimony of witnesses offered 
by the defendants who testified to the artistic value of the 
film, which testimony the Court finds to be credible; and the 
Court having rendered its judgment in open Court and on the 
record, now, therefore, the Court makes the following 
Appendix i 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The State has failed to satisfy the Court that 
the film taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political , scientific or educational value. 
2. The Court finds as a fact that the film taken 
as a whole does have serious literary and artistic value. 
3. Since the film taken as a whole does not lack 
serious literary or artistic value, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether the sexual scenes in the film are patently offensive 
or appeal to the prurient interest. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
I 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law that the film is not obscene 
within the meaning of that term in North Carolina General 
Statutes 14-190.1 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the complaint of the District Attorney is hereby dis-
missed. 
This the 3 day of October, 1974. 
/S/ 
JAMES G. EXUM, Jr. 
Superior Court Judge 
The parties hereto consent to the signing of this 
Judgment, the entry of the Appeal Entries and the giving of 
Appendix ii 
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Notice of Appeal out of term, district and session. 
This the 7th day of October, 1974. 
/s/ 
FRANK J. YEAGER, District Attorney 
Twenty-First Judicial District of 
North Carolina 
/s/ 
GEORGE M. CLELAND 
Attorney for Defendants 
1920 Wachovia Building 
Winston-Salem, N.C. 27101 
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